The Philippines has become a testing ground for countering the Chinese government. South China Sea It takes the most risks, but so far has shown inconsistent and underwhelming results. Its predicament explains why other Southeast Asian claimants remain unlikely to follow this lead. The lukewarm response to Manila’s proposal for a code of conduct specifically for ASEAN claimants is instructive.
As has happened in the past, the loss of economic opportunities and the further erosion of Manila’s position in flashpoints compared to other contesting countries will lead to policy changes in response to maritime issues in the wake of the 2028 presidential election. The possibility of conversion may arise.
China has the most extensive territorial claims and is the most active in interfering with other claimants’ economic and security activities in the South China Sea. However, the resistance to it is China It depends on risk thresholds, the level of economic interdependence with the region’s largest trading partners, and the importance of maritime disputes and broader ties with Beijing. China’s pressure is also being applied unevenly, as other disputed countries still have better access to fisheries and hydrocarbons, and are even able to undertake large-scale reclamation work on disputed terrain. Realism and realpolitik guide the policies of most Southeast Asian coastal states in dealing with China over hotspots.
Philippines accuses Chinese ship of ‘dangerous’ navigation in South China Sea
last year, Philippines We have begun to expose China’s illegal activities in the disputed waters. Reporters were sent on regular patrols and replenishment sorties to document interference by Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels. The idea is to rally local and international support and impose reputational costs on the Chinese government.
This approach has made progress in building up Manila’s defenses, strengthening its alliance with the United States, and mustering public support for a tougher stance against China. However, it also led to domestic political polarization, affected people-to-people ties, and reduced China’s economic interest in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Beijing remains undeterred, weathering the reputational damage and continuing to use its potential for escalation in the South China Sea.
The Philippines’ transparency approach has not yet deterred China. Quite the contrary, China is increasing pressure on its smaller neighbor. There was a breather after the 8th meeting of the Philippines-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism held in Shanghai last month. After vocal protests, Manila says it will take more than naming and shaming to stop Beijing in the South China Sea, much less force it to comply with a landmark 2016 ruling by the Hague Court of Arbitration on the dispute between the two countries. I realized that it goes without saying. That favor.
Growing maritime challenges have prompted the Philippines to embark on a major military buildup, including plans to acquire submarines for the first time. Manila also increased military exercises and joint navigation with the United States and its allies, expanding the United States’ strategic presence in the country. She has concluded a reciprocal access agreement with Japan and is negotiating a visiting force agreement with France. The push for transparency has spurred long-overdue military modernization and revitalized the alliance with the United States.
Washington also promoted Manila’s alignment with broader American programs in the region, achieving the goal of joint deterrence. The United States was given access to three bases in northern Luzon, close to but far from the South China Sea. Taiwan, a hot button issue between Beijing and Washington. The United States also plans to develop a port in the Philippines’ northernmost province of Batanes, within 200 kilometers of Taiwan.
U.S. and Filipino soldiers train during Balikatan training in Zambales, Philippines, April 11, 2019. Photo: EPA-EFE
But Manila’s approach has also created domestic rifts. Foreign policy was one area where there were differences between the previous and current administrations. This is a contributing factor to the breakdown in relations between the Marcos and Duterte families, two powerful political families whose United Team alliance dominated the 2022 presidential election.
Dutertes’ home island of Mindanao is the Philippines’ second-largest island and home to the country’s largest mines and plantations, making China its biggest buyer of ore and fruit exports. The country’s merchandise trade has grown in recent years due to expanded access to the Chinese market. The Chinese government has cleared the way for durian exports from the Philippines and promised to invest in mineral processing facilities. Amid rising tensions, the former president Rodrigo Duterte He made a personal visit to Beijing in July last year and met with the Chinese president. Xi Jinping.
A cleavage has appeared. Immy Marcos, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the president’s sister, questioned the location of new military bases that the United States could access because of their distance from the South China Sea. She also asked about a large shipment of fuel from a U.S. military base in Hawaii to a former U.S. naval base in Subic. Cagayan Governor Manuel Mamba opposed the construction of a US military base, saying it would affect Chinese investment and potentially make the province a target of the US-China conflict over Taiwan. Filipino businessmen, who rarely intervene in geopolitics, also spoke out, suggesting unrest is spreading in the business world. Mall, real estate and banking tycoon Teresita Sy-Coson called for restraint and diplomacy. Exposure of these fault lines could have an impact on next year’s midterm elections.
Will the Philippine vice president’s pro-China comments dampen Manila’s South China Sea policy?
Although the Philippines’ movements in the South China Sea have not yet triggered full military action or economic coercion from Beijing, the impact is clear. China’s 40% stake in China’s national power grid remains securitized 15 years after the agreement. Politics has made the Philippines an unreliable investment destination for long-term Chinese infrastructure capital.meanwhile Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia While – other South China Sea coastal countries – receive Chinese-led railway projects, the Philippines only has river bridges, irrigation, and drug rehabilitation centers.
During President Xi’s visit to Hanoi in December last year, both sides promised to upgrade the Kunming-Hai Phong railway line. By contrast, China’s funding for three rail projects mooted during the previous Duterte administration has already stalled.China is unlikely to be a strong partner for the president ferdinand marcos jr.‘s Build Better More Infrastructure Program.
loss in sightseeing The field has also become clearer. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the fastest growing tourism market in the Philippines, accounting for more than 1.7 million arrivals or 21.1% market share, second only to South Korea. Last year, as Asian countries scrambled to be the first to benefit, Chinese touristsThe Philippines only received more than 260,000 Chinese tourists, and its market share shrank to just 4.84 percent.
Passengers from Guangdong province arrive at Manila airport. In 2019, before the pandemic, China was the fastest growing tourism market in the Philippines. Photo: EPA-EFE
Ironically, although President Duterte’s China policy has been talked about as a policy of appeasement, it was under President Duterte’s watch that the Philippines undertook the largest infrastructure development in the Spratly Islands since the 1970s. Ta. He also invested in modernizing the country’s military, procuring modern frigates. South Koreafrom a multi-purpose vessel. Japan and from cruise missiles India. All this happened while relations with China remained stable.
Another irony is that while Manila is celebrating every resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal that successfully escaped the Chinese blockade, Vietnam is celebrating the massive reclamation of its Spratly outpost and the potential of a second airfield. There was reportedly little interference from China as preparations were busy.
These should provide much insight as the Philippines’ strategy regarding maritime disputes evolves.
Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a researcher at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation.
