Beyond the Matei Plan: Exploring Italy’s African Policy

On January 28th and 29th, the Italian government will hold the much-anticipated Africa Summit, where Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will present a strategic plan for the continent. The plan is named after Enrico Mattei, an Italian administrator who advocated for Italy to assist North African governments in economic growth and natural resource development in the 1950s. Seventy years later, Meloni presents the Mattei plan as the crown jewel of his own foreign policy, aiming to once again renew Italy’s approach to the African continent. But as it stands, the plan is far from comprehensive.

Looking ahead to the year ahead, Italy cannot afford to be vague about its Africa policy. Around 40 percent of Italy’s gas comes from African producers, and this number is only going to increase. Engagement in the Sahel and North Africa to alleviate growing instability and foreign interference has been at times careless. Rome’s attempts to cooperate on migration have largely failed, even though 80% of irregular arrivals to Italy come from North African ports. The climate and energy crisis, political instability, and irregular migration are unlikely to go away anytime soon. As the details of the Matei plan are worked out, the Italian government would do well to shift its African policy from reaction to action by fostering cooperation with African capital to address these long-term mutual interests.

Enrico Mattei saw Africa as a new battleground between East and West. From Sudan to Mali, Russia is increasing its involvement in Africa, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative is increasing the country’s influence across the continent. Many Africans remember with disdain that the approach once adopted by Italy and other Western countries was an act of containment rather than one based on mutual benefit and cooperation on equal footing. This is not helped by the fact that Italy has never properly addressed its colonial past and has largely ignored its moral responsibility to right the wrongs of its former colonies. This widespread ignorance provides fertile ground for Meloni to frame the Mattei plan as non-predatory to his African peers, even though there is no evidence to support it. Rather, a successful new initiative between Italy and the African continent requires deep historical awareness and a keen foresight regarding its reception.

Meloni is not the first Italian prime minister to focus on strengthening ties with Africa. In 2007, Romano Prodi became the first Italian Prime Minister to visit the African Union. Subsequently, Matteo Renzi further intensified such efforts. From 2014 to 2016, we announced the opening of five new embassies on the continent, approved a new law on development assistance, and expanded seven African capitals to foster cooperation, investment and relationships. visited. However, unlike his predecessors, Meloni believes that Italy’s involvement in Africa can only be achieved through a multi-year strategy supported by clear policy instruments if it is to bear fruit in terms of influence. seems to understand.

Unfortunately, however, beyond the insight that they are necessary, the content of strategies and policy instruments remains a mystery. So far, the government has announced a decree to spend 3 million euros to create a structure to manage the plan. For now, it is understood that Palace Chigi will be in charge, which is nothing new. As with many other documents, Mr. Meloni uses traditional and perhaps better facilities Avoided any measures that appeared to be in place. cooperation. At this rate, it will take at least six months for the Mattei Plan’s new structure to become operational, and until then its strategy, objectives, and funding remain unclear.

As far as strategy is concerned, the Prime Minister’s announcement suggests that the Mattei plan focuses on energy supplies and aims to stimulate investment on the continent. This seems like a somewhat outdated vision. Initiating a policy of investing in fossil energy in Africa while emphasizing the transition of the Italian economy away from fossil fuels seems contradictory at best and requires more forethought. The Matei plan should instead focus on developing more future-proof energy supplies that will benefit Italy and its partner countries, following in the footsteps of the European Union’s new green hydrogen agreement with Namibia, for example.

But first and foremost, many of the African countries to which Italy is most concerned, whether through immigrant communities like Senegal or through historical involvement like Ethiopia and Mozambique, need more than energy agreements. Yes, and in some cases, you may not be in a position. Please enter. Indeed, signs of internal conflict are increasing in some countries in the Sahel, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. and that in such cases, sourcing private investment in energy markets in the Sahel region, which has seen eight coups in the past three years, will be difficult, as will the lack of state capacity to facilitate and implement such agreements. may be revealed.

Here, Italian policymakers should start by investing in mediation efforts. Such an approach would be beneficial to Italy’s national interests, which primarily concern the stability of neighboring African countries, especially migration flows and the neutralization of Russian and Chinese influence. This is an area where Italy has achieved impressive results in the past, relying on the capacities of both Farnesina and civil society (such as Sant’Egidio) (for example, the peace agreement signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992 , ending a peace agreement) and 30 years of civil war in Mozambique). Going forward, it would be desirable for the Rome government to once again have at its disposal these instruments of development cooperation.

When it comes to financing, Italy faces tight budgets and resources are generally scarce. However, without money, nothing can be done, especially no concrete policy for a population 23 times larger than Italy’s. African countries have participated in a number of international summits over the past two decades, from the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, now in its eighth year, to the Africa-EU Partnership, which promised substantial aid programs. Without sufficient resources, Italy’s plans will quickly pale in comparison. To avoid appearing unreliable, Rome’s declared interest in the continent must be supported by appropriate budgetary allocations. Among his first efforts, Prime Minister Meloni cut foreign aid cooperation funding in the 2023 budget, but instead introduced a multi-year plan to help Italy meet the United Nations target of 0.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) on development aid. An allocation plan should be given to Italy. By 2030.

Finally, a note on naming plans: Nostalgia can be a trap. As provocative as it may be to use the name of an anti-fascist, pragmatic and visionary Italian, Italy and Africa no longer belong to Enrico Mattei. Italy’s African policy cannot be without or against Europe. Italy’s great project for Africa can only work in conjunction with the EU’s project to mediate and stabilize Africa. In this regard, the Government of Rome should spearhead further efforts through the European Commission to strengthen mediation efforts in African conflicts. But coordinating such a mediation effort would require money, persistence, and good relations with other European capitals (including Paris), rather than a general idea that could disappear after the election campaign. This will require strong relationships and continued political engagement. It will be a test and an opportunity for Italy and for Europe.