Last week on FP Live, columnist Stephen Walt looked back at the most important trends and developments of 2023. His next task is the herculean task of predicting how global events will unfold in 2024.
FP subscribers can watch the full video interview in the box at the top of this page. Below is a condensed and edited transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: What are the most underestimated risks in 2024? In other words, what do we need to worry about that we aren’t already worried about?
Stephen Walt: One is the possibility that the conflict in the Middle East will significantly intensify. The good news is that so far, none of the bystanders or third parties in the area seem too keen to get involved. There was a small conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. The Houthis fired several rockets. But generally everyone seems to want to keep this limited and limited.
If the conflict continues and lasts for months, most of the regional powers may be less able or willing to remain on the sidelines. If a serious war were to break out between Israel and Hezbollah, which would force Iran to become more involved – which would, of course, result in the US being drawn to Israel’s side – suddenly we would This would lead to the eruption of regional conflicts of a kind never seen before. We won’t really see it until decades later.
La: How do you think things will unfold between Israel and Palestine in the coming months? How do you think things will be a year from now?
SW: Unfortunately, I don’t think things have changed much a year from now. By then the violence will have ended. There will likely be some form of ceasefire or an end to Israeli military operations in Gaza. Gaza will be largely destroyed. Therefore, this is a humanitarian crisis of very large scale, and it will not end in a year or so.
The fundamental question, the political question of how Israelis and Palestinians coexist in this geographic space, will not be resolved a year from now. In a sense, we will be walking down a path in vain. I don’t think we’ll see a change where the Israeli government suddenly says, “We’re in favor of really pursuing a two-state solution.” It is unlikely that a reformed and newly empowered Palestinian Authority will emerge. I don’t think we’ll ever see Hamas eliminated. We may even see Hamas become more popular as a symbol of Palestinian resistance in both Gaza and the West Bank. The depressing news here is that a year from now, by the time we have this conversation, this issue will remain just as intractable and unresolved as it is today. It means deaf.
La: What about a possible Israeli agreement to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia?
SW: Although the conflict has put these negotiations on hold for now, I don’t think it’s possible in the long term. This is because the incentives that various parties had for this deal have not disappeared. In the American case, the main motivation actually had nothing to do with the Israeli-Arab conflict. At a time when Saudi Arabia was at least somewhat collusive with China, we were trying to get Riyadh on our side by entering into some kind of security agreement with them. The way to achieve that through the American political system was to link it to normalization with Israel. The motivation to keep Saudi Arabia within the US security orbit and prevent it from realigning with China remains.
Saudi Arabia wants to get the best deal possible and wants security guarantees from the United States. Israelis hope for a symbolic outcome: a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. I think that possibility will come back again. The question is how quickly the conflict will return, but that will largely depend on how it plays out and how it affects Arabs.
La: How do you feel the anger over Gaza could affect power relations in the Middle East and in the United States?
SW: Arab public opinion has always been more confrontational and certainly less sympathetic toward Israel than the attitudes and policies of many governments. The most notable was Egypt, which eventually signed a peace agreement with Israel. The Israeli and Egyptian governments have basically jointly kept a lid on Gaza for years. That is very different from the opinion of many Egyptians. And that applies not only to Saudi Arabia, but also to many Gulf states, perhaps most notably Jordan.
This highlights deep tensions for the United States. While the United States supports democracy and says that the people should rule, when it comes to the Middle East, if the people were actually in charge, would they shape policies or what those policies would look like? Many of those governments’ positions will be quite different, even if they have a louder voice about what will happen.
La: Are there any events you have marked on your calendar to be on the lookout for in 2024?
SW: Yes, it’s NATO’s 75th anniversary. But this is happening with two shadows. One is that the war in Ukraine will not work, and this will be seen as a failure of the alliance. The second dark cloud is the possibility of re-election of Donald Trump, who has cast doubt on the future of NATO and has no love for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU).
La: One frame of reference for 2024 is that it will be a year in which more people will vote than in any other year in history. This year will begin with the Taiwanese general election in January. If the incumbent pro-independence party is re-elected, it could stir up tensions in the Taiwan Strait and reverse some of the recent constructive dialogue between the United States and China.
SW: The results there will be very important. Incumbent candidates from the ruling Democratic People’s Party have been outspoken on the issue of independence in the past. He has been toned down on his statements lately. Therefore, attempts are being made to withdraw from promoting the possibility of independence. The message he has consistently gotten from the United States and other countries is that even if he wins the election, the last thing he should do after taking office is to force China, given the deeply divided opposition. It means doing what you want to do. He takes actions that seriously destabilize the region.
I think the status quo will continue to be maintained a year from now. But it’s certainly an election that we want to watch and one that we want to pay close attention to the outcome of.
La: A major election is coming up in India in the first half of this year. India’s foreign policy has become more dynamic in recent years. How do you think this situation will develop into 2024?
SW: I think it’s the prime minister [Narendra] Mr. Modi is expected to be re-elected with an overwhelming majority, which would strengthen the policy positions he has taken at home and abroad. It illustrates the new features of an increasingly multipolar world in which India, in many ways, adopts a more independent position as it becomes more powerful. Yes, we want to be closer to the US to balance China, but we also have close ties with Russia to get cheap energy and help the Indian economy. The fact that there is tension between these two goals shows how politics works when a number of different factions compete. This is something America has to get used to.
La: Indonesia will hold another big election in 2024. A broader discussion of how the world should think about this Muslim-majority powerhouse in Southeast Asia, which has a population of over 200 million people but rarely receives enough attention in the global media. Do you have any thoughts on the impact?
SW: We need to think more carefully about Indonesia’s future trajectory precisely because of its size and economic growth. Over time, it will become a more important player. If the United States and others are truly focused on the balance of power in Asia, what direction Indonesia decides to take could be very important.
La: When you think about all the elections coming up in 2024, what worries you most?
SW: As an American, my biggest concern is the outcome of the November 2024 election. I don’t think technology will have much of an impact on the next election cycle. I think the ability of social media and AI to influence them is still quite limited. But I am concerned about the degree of polarization in the United States, which makes it impossible for countries to agree on the same facts.
The trends in 2023 that we should all be happy about are that inflation appears to be actually under control in the United States, and that the U.S. economy is doing significantly better by almost every measure. But most Americans think otherwise. People now only get information from sources they already consent to. In almost all of these situations, what concerns me is the tendency for opinions to become concentrated and siled to the point that everyone knows what they believe. think. What we forget is that we probably believe that’s not all there is to it. Because we never hear another point of view.
La: Let’s talk a little more about the 2024 US election. What are the risks to the world if we end up with Biden 2.0 or Trump 2.0?
SW: Biden 2.0 will be mostly continuity. You won’t see any dramatic changes. If Biden is re-elected, the United States will move more directly into negotiating a settlement for the Ukraine war. Before the elections they will not want to admit that Ukraine cannot win, but after the elections they will be interested in striking a deal. If Mr. Trump is elected, he will begin almost immediately to distance himself from Ukraine and essentially force any deal possible.
In Asia, the two will be the same. President Trump is very concerned about China, and the Biden administration has continued and even strengthened some of President Trump’s China policies, albeit in a more targeted manner. Mr. Biden has been very effective in organizing alliances in Asia. Trump has no intention of dismantling those alliances. He just becomes a more difficult person for all of them. The situation will be more difficult in Asia, but all of America’s major commitments will remain as they relate to China.
The area to really worry about is Europe. Trump has not lost his love for the European Union. He thinks NATO may also be outdated. If I were a European leader, I would start avoiding a lot of the risks of a possible Trump presidency.
La: If Trump is elected, are there guardrails that other countries can rely on?
SW: One guardrail is that other countries can join forces to oppose or limit U.S. actions. The United States is very powerful, but not supreme. We need cooperation from the rest of the world, in the economy and in all other areas.
Other guardrails exist within the U.S. system of governance that actually placed substantial limits on what President Trump could do in his first term. The establishment placed substantial constraints on what he accomplished. They learned that he had a short attention span. My concern is that some of that will not be possible in the second term, as they learn from the experience of the first term and try to exert greater control over the bureaucracy.
La: Last question. What will happen to US-China relations in 2024?
SW: I think both the United States and China have a genuine interest in ensuring that relations do not deteriorate dramatically over the next year. The United States is currently busy dealing with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. The last thing we need is a crisis somewhere in Asia while everything else is happening.
Similarly, China’s economy is not doing well.Chaos within the Chinese government is clearly causing a headache. [Chinese President] Xi Jinping. Relations between the two countries are complicated by tensions that China has with other countries. They have tried to make peace with other countries in Asia and, of course, with European countries. Both sides have an incentive to keep this competition somewhat contained over the next year or so.