There has been much debate in the West about the possibility of China replacing, or at least rivaling, the United States as the world’s leading superpower. However, the ongoing security crisis in the Red Sea makes it clear that this remains a distant prospect.
China has a trade-driven economy that relies on the free flow of trade through choke points such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait off the coast of Yemen, and relies on the United States to protect its international sea lanes. A U.S.-led military response to Houthi militia attacks on international shipping may not ultimately be the solution to the current crisis—though so far the Houthis appear undaunted—but the U.S. At the very least, routes linking China to the Middle East and Europe demonstrate a clear commitment to keeping vital trade open.
Far from acting like the world leader it claims to be, China has declared its only overseas military base in Djibouti, adjacent to the Red Sea Strait, and is willing to accept the costs and risks of securing the Red Sea. I haven’t made any noticeable movements to bear the burden. Nor has it publicly offered viable alternatives to U.S. action. Instead, he seems content to mostly sit back and offer veiled criticism of the US military’s response.
The Chinese government is playing a cynical game, trying to play both sides, free riding on the power of the same United States it despises.
For China’s leaders, there is a certain strategic logic to this. The Red Sea crisis distracts from America’s focus on Asia and buys China time to build up its capabilities in the Western Pacific while presenting itself as a benevolent power that does not interfere in other countries’ affairs. In at least one important respect, it’s working well. Houthi leaders are apparently allowing Chinese merchant ships to sail through the Red Sea unscathed in exchange for China’s non-interference in the conflict.
President Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan was scheduled to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Thailand on Friday and Saturday to discuss the situation, U.S. officials said. The United States condemns China’s duplicity and supports China as a responsible power and in its own interests by sharing some of the burden of protecting trade routes and using its influence on Iran to stop Houthi attacks. We have to put pressure on people to start taking action. About shipping.
Chinese leaders hope to further improve their status in the region. President Xi Jinping has pledged to “contribute China’s wisdom to promoting peace and tranquility in the Middle East” and has announced a number of corresponding security and development initiatives in recent years. But in reality, China’s actions in the Middle East are driven in part by a desire to challenge US power. For example, in the Israel-Gaza war, China joined Russia and Iran in nominally supporting Hamas and refusing to condemn the group’s October 7 attack on Israel.
The deteriorating security situation in the Middle East shows how ineffective Mr. Xi’s promotion of peace and tranquility has been, and it is set to come back to bite China. About half of China’s oil imports come from the Middle East, making the Red Sea a key access to Europe, one of China’s biggest export markets. The country’s shipping companies and exporters have been squeezed by commercial disruption, even as the Houthis have granted passage to ships flying Chinese flags.
If the regional crisis continues for a long time, there is a possibility that pressure will increase on the domestic Communist Party. The domestic economy already faces strong headwinds and cannot afford to withstand risks such as supply chain tangles and rising shipping and insurance costs. In the long term, Beijing’s reputation could be damaged if it is seen as opportunistic in the region.
The Red Sea crisis is a reminder of the fragility of global commercial trade and our shared responsibility to protect it. Washington has a fundamental interest in protecting freedom of the seas, both as a fundamental international norm and in the economic interests of the United States. However, a stable and open maritime trade system is a public good that requires more active burden-sharing by stakeholders like China.
China has said little publicly about Houthi attacks on international shipping, other than vague calls for an end to “harassment” of civilian vessels. Iran’s role as an economic lifeline gives China significant leverage. But Beijing is willing to restrain Tehran from adding further fuel to regional fires and providing support to Houthi militias, undermining China’s effectiveness as a security patron. Either it doesn’t exist or it doesn’t seem to be able to be suppressed. China uses the Red Sea free pass to implicitly lend legitimacy to Houthi attacks on civilian targets.
China’s nascent overseas forces may lack the confidence to take on a larger role in disputed waters, and whether encouraging a stronger Chinese military presence on the high seas is desirable from a Western perspective remains to be seen. There are obvious questions. But this need not cause undue worry in the West. There is little indication so far that China can or will project the level of military power abroad that the United States currently does, beyond protecting its own merchant ships from piracy. It’s been going on for over 10 years.
The United States will remind Beijing that its long-term energy security and supply chains are at stake in the Red Sea, including by engaging in cooperative crisis diplomacy to help resolve the issue. , should apply pressure to act accordingly as a constructive player. Disruptions that create disproportionate risks for China. The U.S. government is willing to work with Beijing to stabilize the Middle East and encourage China to play a more important role economically, diplomatically, and perhaps militarily in countering common security threats. Should.
As the world’s top trading nation, China has been and will continue to be a major beneficiary of an open global trading system. America’s commitment to protecting this system cannot be guaranteed forever, especially if we believe Beijing’s narrative that American power is in decline.
China’s seeming indifference to the Red Sea crisis strengthens the role of the United States as the world’s dominant power and demonstrates that China’s capabilities and strategic objectives beyond its own region remain narrow and dependent on American global leadership. It shows.
Isaac Cardon (@ibkardon) He is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Asia Program and author of China’s Law of the Sea: New Rules for the World Order.jennifer kavanagh (@jekavanagh) He is a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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