U.S. bombing campaign against Iranian proxies hits more than 85 targets, threatening regional conflagration after recent drone strikes in Jordan killed three Americans and injured dozens . The crisis began after the Houthis attacked merchant ships in the Red Sea from Yemen, disrupting supply chains, raising maritime insurance and shipping costs, and threatening a global recession.
Amid the flood of international condemnation, one actor’s silence speaks volumes about China’s silence. On the surface, China and President Xi Jinping are putting on a great poker face. But that cannot hide China’s enviable dilemma. China’s ambitions for world leadership require expanding its influence in the Middle East, while at the same time the Chinese economy and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party are threatened by Iran’s tyranny.
Iran, the Houthis’ backer, has had close ties with China for years, with China recently mediating the normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Iran’s membership in the Chinese-led BRICS coalition. Although Iran is under sanctions by the United States, China, like Russia, has embraced Iranian leadership, and a Chinese statement said Beijing would “participate constructively” in Tehran’s nuclear program. It is being As Iranian protests intensified, China issued a statement opposing “external forces interfering in Iran’s internal affairs.”
China’s past wholehearted support for Tehran has now withered, Iranian proxies are being bombed, and Iran has openly declared that it is not afraid of war with the United States. Regarding the Houthis, China’s Foreign Ministry has only publicly stated that “all parties” should “avoid inciting flames,” sharply avoiding its usual criticism of Western powers’ “hegemonic bullying” behavior. .
All statements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the situation in Yemen have been similarly non-committal, and as of the publication of this article, no detailed statements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Yemen crisis or the economic or political dangers of a US attack on Iran have been available. It’s not out.
These clichés not only contradict Beijing’s own past sentiments, but also its recent sense of commitment to Tehran. Attempts to establish an “open-ended partnership” between these two countries have always been futile, and Xi Jinping has probably been aware of this for some time.
Despite its hostility toward the United States, China does not benefit from the high levels of violence and instability that could disrupt the global economic apple car. The Chinese government is trying to rebuild the system and capture it intact. In contrast, Tehran believes it cannot advance its agenda in its current state and understands that it is too weak to be an equal competitor with the United States and the West. Tehran must resort to asymmetric violence to achieve its political objectives, which could frustrate China’s rise.
Mr. Xi has previously said he has navigated this strategic conflict by mastering the art of pivoting and strategic ambiguity, employing all tactics that can reap the benefits of cooperation without compromising long-term economic and security goals. It’s here. And the recent US attacks and response to the Houthis are no exception.
As this crisis progresses, we should not expect China to categorically condemn Iran’s potential role in supporting Houthi attacks, but we should also expect that China will become a fundamental obstacle to resolving the crisis. Shouldn’t. Mr. Xi already knows how bad a prolonged conflict could be, especially with China’s Evergrande liquidation raising questions about China’s economy.
But despite these economic woes, for China, the political benefits of appearing neutral outweigh the threat of soaring energy prices, especially as it expects the West to resolve its crisis. ing. If the West wants to secure China’s assistance in mitigating the Red Sea crisis, Washington will have to make the following proposals: Political This gives Beijing an incentive to renege on its commitments to Iran and aggressively coerce Iran into cooperating. This is easier said than done.
The United States could increase the cost of China’s silence by exacerbating the crisis and forcing the economic fallout to catch up with China. This is extremely dangerous. Given the sheer size, scale, and scope of China’s economy, not to mention Xi Jinping’s political determination, how long will it take before the loss of the Red Sea trade route incurs costs that exceed those the Chinese government is willing to incur? It could take months, at which point the crisis could become more serious. We are already on the verge of a full-scale international war. Such an unlikely scenario would undermine the United States’ reputation as a guarantor of free and open trade and require it to adopt a strategy that demands domestic sacrifice in an election year, but this It would be politically fatal for Joe Biden.
The United States cannot afford to remain indifferent toward Iran and the Houthis, even if it inadvertently helps China’s economy.
And this is a long-term idea. The United States should publicly invite China to join anti-Houthi operations in Yemen. There is nothing wrong with inviting trade competitors to cooperate in the name of protecting international freedom of navigation, although China will almost certainly refuse. China’s military bases near Djibouti make this operation logistically viable, and its acceptance would demonstrate that China is a responsible international partner, while also potentially driving a wedge between Tehran and China. .
China may already be approaching the limits of what it can sacrifice to maintain good relations with Iran. Iranian sources claim that China has already tightened its stance against the Houthis. The escalation of conflicts in the Middle East has exposed China as a strategic novice in the region and highlighted the inherent conflict it faces between its economic and geopolitical interests.
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Wesley Alexander Hill and Annie Rubinson contributed to this article.