As 2023 draws to a close, China announced a new defense minister to replace General Li Shangfu, who was dismissed from his post several months ago. On December 29, Admiral Dongjun, who had just resigned as chief of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), was announced as Li’s successor.
Contrary to popular belief, the appointment of a former navy chief to the post of China’s defense minister does not primarily mean that the navy will be given high priority in the Chinese government’s military planning. This view misunderstands both the timeline for China’s naval expansion and the role of China’s defense minister.
China’s expansion and assertiveness of its navy is not new. Its most salient features are already well known – China’s illegal occupation and reclamation of the South China Sea, the opening of a military base in Djibouti, the rapid launch of several aircraft carriers, and the PLA Navy’s expansion around Taiwan. It is an activity. From an Indian perspective, the past few years have also seen PLA Navy counter-piracy operations in the western Indian Ocean and submarine visits to Karachi and Colombo. Currently, the Chinese Navy is the largest in the world, with more ships than the United States Navy, the world’s most powerful navy.
China’s intentions have been made public for decades, including in various reports, statements, and defense white papers by Chinese leaders. Some would argue that even if China’s previous actions were not enough, the decisive signal came in the 2015 Defense White Paper. The white paper specifically spoke of “maritime military struggle and maritime preparedness for military struggle.”
On the other hand, China’s Minister of Defense is not the top national defense official, but rather a position whose purpose is to deal with the country’s external affairs. This is in contrast to India, where Raksha Mantri is a senior politician and a member of the Cabinet Committee on Security. In the United States, the current Secretary of Defense, General Lloyd Austin, disappeared from public view for medical reasons without informing the White House, prompting calls for his removal.
The People’s Liberation Army is the military arm of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), and its first job is to protect the regime, not the Chinese state or people. The defense minister is usually the fourth-ranking member of the Central Military Commission, behind Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, who chairs the committee, and two other military generals, who serve as vice chairs.
However, there are important aspects to Dong’s appointment.
For one, thanks to his career in the Navy, Mr. Dong is already well-versed in foreign affairs, much better than his colleagues in the People’s Liberation Army, the powerful branch of the People’s Liberation Army. And now is also the time when China could use better external communications. Following President Xi’s meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco last November, military dialogue and exchanges are expected to expand. The main purpose of these dialogues is to prevent incidents at sea and elsewhere from escalating into crises. But for the Chinese, there is an additional objective: to be seen and accepted as equals to the United States.
Second, these ambitions also require the Secretary of Defense to stand firm with the American people. Dong’s career path is important here. He had held appointments as deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet and deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command, and was expected to be involved in planning actions over Taiwan and the South China Sea, which are the source of current tensions with the United States.
In addition, Mr. Dong has participated in Sino-Russian naval exercises and other high-level exchanges for more than a decade, contributing to support particularly important aspects of China’s foreign policy. China considers its relationship with Russia important to counter America’s global influence and power.
Elsewhere, Dong has led the China-Pakistan joint naval exercise Sea Guardians 2020, another part of China’s efforts to challenge American dominance in its neighbourhood, and to challenge American allies. It is also targeting India, which is seen as a Considering all this, and especially given his experience in joint operations, Mr. Dong’s rise reflects Mr. Xi’s preference for quickly promoting personnel who meet his criteria for keeping the PLA combat-ready. ing. However, given the expansion of China’s military (including its navy) since the beginning of this century, there are several officers with such experience in the senior leadership.
Third, Dong’s appointment must also be understood from the perspective of China’s domestic politics. Dong served as the PLA Navy commander for two years of a typical five-year term. This is the first unusual feature of his recent appointment. Second, he resigned in December and attended the swearing-in ceremony of his successor, Hu Zhongming, suggesting he was indifferent to the controversy and corruption charges surrounding former defense minister General Li.
Mr. Xi’s choice of a person from the People’s Liberation Army is probably due to the fact that even after a decade of anti-corruption campaigns, it is still difficult to find someone who will fully rise to the top in the military, rocketry, and other departments of the People’s Liberation Army. It probably has a lot to do with it. Power. The commander of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, who was dismissed last year, was also removed along with several other officers and replaced by an admiral of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Therefore, selecting the defense minister from the Chinese navy is also an attempt to avoid further embarrassment for China both domestically and externally.
Javin T. Jacob is Director and Devendra Kumar Associate Research Fellow of the Himalayan Research Center of Excellence in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Shiv Nadar Institute of Eminence, Delhi-NCR.The views expressed are personal