Nordic-Baltic region: An example of NATO

Russia has now become a wartime economy. The Nordic and Baltic states closest to Russia have gotten the message and are preparing.

Despite being the newest NATO member, Finland is in better shape than most of the other 28 members of the European alliance. Empty stockpiles and slow weapons production are causing concern elsewhere in Europe, but not in Finland.

The Finnish Defense Forces (FDF) received additional funding for procurement and immediately issued new contracts in spring 2022, shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion and before other countries were aware of the problem. As a result, the country’s stockpile is so full that more warehouse capacity is needed.

This year, the FDF will also carry out logistics exercises and activate so-called production reserve agreements with private companies, which secure reserve capacity for the Defense Force’s needs in a crisis or war, similar to war economy lights. ing. This pre-conflict period tests the sufficient availability and production capacity of everything from food supplies to machinery, with sustained fighting in mind, as we saw in Ukraine.

Finland’s efforts to maintain an efficient national defense force are motivated by its close proximity to Russia and its history of invasions from the east. It is explained that other countries in the Nordic-Baltic region have similarly increased their level of preparedness over the past two years for similar reasons.

The Baltic states have several joint procurement agreements for major weapons systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS. Other joint Baltic initiatives include the Livonian air defense shield, the Latvian-Estonian joint procurement of the IRIS-T air defense system, and the Baltic Sea to jointly strengthen the shared border with Russia and increase the ability to deter and slow enemy movements. This includes the line of defense.

Latvia reintroduced conscription in January, Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015, and Estonia has had conscription since the 1990s. All three Baltic states are on track to have defense spending reach 3% of GDP in the coming years, 50% above NATO requirements.

The Nordic countries are also taking steps individually and jointly to increase domestic production of ammunition and other military equipment.

Finland is working to more than double its artillery ammunition production, which would make it one of Europe’s largest producers. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden recently signed an agreement to jointly increase ammunition production within the framework of NORDEFCO. This is aimed at increasing regional supply security and ensuring long-term support to Ukraine.

In conjunction with funding from the European Union’s Ammunition Production Support Act (ASAP) program, the Swedish Defense Materiel Agency has signed a contract with Norwegian-Finnish ammunition producer Nammo to increase its production capacity for 155mm artillery shells.

Soon-to-be NATO member Sweden is on track to meet NATO’s 2% defense spending target this year, two years earlier than planned for 2022. Apart from increasing defense production, Sweden is also reviving Cold War-era readiness. Partial conscription was reintroduced in 2017, and civilian military service was reintroduced in January for roles such as the emergency services and energy sector. This becomes part of Sweden’s “total defense obligation”, which applies to all residents aged 16 to 70.

Sweden has also pledged to send 600 troops to a multinational battalion of the Latvian Front Ground Forces if Hungary approves Sweden’s membership in NATO.

It is clear that Finland and Sweden’s membership in NATO will make the Alliance more able than ever to respond to the Russian threat, even if most of Europe’s NATO allies are still far from the level of readiness of the northern states.

Finland’s more than 1,300-mile border with Russia doubles the total length of NATO’s border with Russia, causing some alarm before joining. However, Finland provides significant military capabilities and is a major headache for Russia.

The addition of Finland and Sweden (looked like a certainty this year) has made planning and execution of the defense of the Baltics much easier. Previously, there were doubts about NATO’s ability to strengthen the Baltic states.

Just by maintaining a high level of national defense capabilities, Finland deploys military forces that Russian planners must consider. These include a wartime force of 280,000, a reserve force of up to 870,000, recent investments in Europe’s largest artillery force and long-range fires, and the upcoming phasing out of the F/A-18 Hornet. It includes a capable air force that will introduce 64 new aircraft. F-35.

Add to this the close cooperation of the Nordic Air Forces, which make up the combined fleet of around 250 jets, and the naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden, and Russia’s room for maneuver will be much more limited than before 2022. . The recent Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed by Finland and Sweden with the United States will further strengthen deterrence in the region.

Thanks to the growing cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states and their significant contribution to the defense of Ukraine (the region accounts for 8 of the top 11 contributing countries in terms of GDP share), it has been NATO’s Achilles heel until the last decade. This region is now one of the strongest in the Alliance. -Ready and capable. We are united by a shared awareness of the threat and a willingness to do what is necessary.

Other European allies should take similar steps. Now is the chance to use the time Ukraine has given other European countries to deter Russia.

Minna Ohlander is a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in Helsinki. Her research interests include Nordic security and Nordic defense cooperation, as well as German and Finnish foreign and security policy.

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