Denmark, which has the largest territory in the Arctic among the Arctic Council member states, is in a unique position relative to its size in shaping Arctic policy. Continued possession of Greenland, friction with Russia and China’s growing interest in the region are weighing on Copenhagen’s Arctic policy. In our previous report on Denmark’s Arctic outlook, we identified several hot points for Denmark’s Arctic outlook. We revisit and evaluate those hot points after his year.
Important judgment 1. Denmark is likely to strengthen defense cooperation and security ties with its Arctic neighbors over the next 12 months.
Important judgment 2. Denmark is likely to make significant investments in its military to bring forces to the Arctic region within the next 12 months.
Important decision 3. It is unlikely that China will expand the scope of its economic involvement in Greenland and enable further investment in Russia’s Arctic infrastructure in the next 12 months.
Key Judgment-1: Denmark is likely to strengthen its defense cooperation and security ties with its Arctic neighbors in the next 12 months.
a) On December 19, Denmark signed a 10-year bases agreement with the United States. The agreement allows for the permanent stationing of U.S. forces on Danish territory for the duration of the agreement. Grey Dynamics.
b) On May 3, Danish Defense Minister Troels Poulsen told a Danish newspaper that Denmark’s strategic priority was the Arctic region. The Baltic Sea is our second priority. Mr Poulsen’s comments are a departure from his predecessor’s comments last year that the Baltic Sea was Denmark’s top priority. [source, source].
b) In February, the Danish Foreign Minister completed a three-day visit to Greenland and the Faroe Islands, highlighting deepening security cooperation. The Danish military will build a new early warning radar base in the Faroe Islands. With a range of 3-400 km, this station will monitor approaches from Russia to the North Sea. Grey Dynamics.
c) On 24 March, Denmark agreed to establish the Nordic Air Alliance with Sweden, Norway and Finland at Ramstein Air Base in March. Grey Dynamics.
Key Decision-2: It is very likely that Denmark will invest significantly in its military to bring forces into the Arctic region within the next 12 months.
a) On June 30, Danish political parties reached an agreement to increase defense spending by $20 billion over the next 10 years.Denmark plans to meet the NATO target of defense spending at 2% of GDP by 2030. Grey Dynamics.
b) The Danish Navy plans to introduce a multi-functional patrol vessel towards the beginning of 2025 to replace the outdated Thetis-class patrol vessels. New vessels will use containerized storage to make loading and unloading vessels much easier, making them easier to use in non-permissive environments. Grey Dynamics.
c) In 2022, the Danish Ministry of Defense will call for tenders for new ISR-enabled UAVs, and the tender is expected to be completed by the end of 2024. Grey Dynamics.
d) The Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO), headquartered in Denmark, is actively being upgraded with new command and control (C2) capabilities.This upgrade includes the TERMA JIMAPS C4ISR system Grey Dynamics.
e) Additionally, a new ground station will be built in Greenland to better connect surveillance satellites and ground assets. Grey Dynamics.
f) In late 2023, the Danish military launched a new Arctic basic training program for Greenland residents. This training focuses on developing military skills in arctic conditions. Grey Dynamics.
Important judgment-3: China is unlikely to expand the scope of its economic involvement in Greenland within the next 12 months.
a) In November, Greenlandic politicians stated that there are opportunities for economic engagement with China, but mainly in the areas of fishing and tourism. Grey Dynamics.
b) On October 23, Greenland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs visited China and opened an official mission in Beijing.The visit did not include any discussion of economic investment in Greenland. [source, source].
b) Since last year, China has had only a few dozen migrant factory workers stationed directly in Greenland.Chinese projects in uranium and iron ore mining have been completely canceled or put on hold indefinitely Grey Dynamics.
c) The US government thwarted China’s efforts to purchase an abandoned Danish naval base. Grey Dynamics.
d) China itself reportedly canceled its bid to build two airports in Greenland due to US diplomatic efforts Grey Dynamics.
e) A group of Danish local political representatives expressed concern about Chinese mining interests in Greenland due to environmental concerns. Grey Dynamics.
Analysis overview
We have high confidence in our assessment that Denmark will deepen its security ties with its Arctic neighbors. We base this assessment on international reporting, local reporting, think tank reporting, and official statements from the Danish government. We assume Denmark will take advantage of her ongoing efforts in 2020 and beyond. If this assumption turns out to be wrong, we can expect basic agreements, such as merging air fleets with other Nordic countries, to be cancelled. We considered the alternative of Denmark prioritizing a NATO alliance with Central European countries, but rejected this option due to increased diplomatic activity among the Nordic countries.
power projection
We have high confidence in our assessment that Denmark will invest significantly in its military to project power into the Arctic. We base this assessment on international media coverage, think tank reports, and official statements from the Danish government. We assume that Denmark’s involvement in Ukraine will undermine naval modernization efforts. If this assumption proves incorrect, we can expect delays in the introduction of new patrol boats. We considered the alternative of a policy shift similar to the Danish government’s last year, but rejected this as significant progress has been made in shifting strategic priorities to the Arctic.
Chinese invasion
We have moderate confidence in our assessment that China will not be able to establish strong roots in Greenland. We base this assessment on international, local and think tank coverage. We assume that China will instead divert resources to Russia’s Arctic projects. If this assumption proves incorrect, we would expect Chinese investment and infrastructure development in Greenland to materialize within the next 12 months. We considered an alternative proposal for China to reorganize its efforts in Greenland, but rejected it in the absence of a statement to that effect by the Chinese government.